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Abstract:  Goldin and Rouse (2000) showed that advent of blind auditions caused major 
orchestras to hire more women musicians.  Blind auditions had a similar effect for Asian musicians.   
 










  Goldin and Rouse (2000) found that when orchestras moved to blind auditions, the 
number of female musicians they hired rose substantially.  We extend their results to show that 
the same thing happened with Asian musicians: following introduction of blind auditions, the 
number of Asian musicians also rose substantially and immediately.  This suggests that before 
the blind auditions orchestras discriminated against Asian players.  If so, the discrimination in 
question occurred outside the South, after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in a highly 
skilled occupation, and in a field where most of the audience was highly educated. 
 The reason we cannot be sure about discrimination is that part of the increase in hiring 
of Asian musicians may have occurred because blind auditions may have caused the number of 
Asians who auditioned to increase, and the greater number of auditionees may have been 
responsible in part for the rise in hiring.  Because they had data on auditionees, Goldin and 
Rouse could establish that blind auditions increased the number of female auditionees, and that 
part of the rise in female hiring was due to increased number of auditionees.  We do not have 
data on auditionees and so do not know whether Asian auditionees increased the way female 
auditionees did.   
 Even if the number of Asian auditionees increased, it is unlikely that the increase in Asian 
musicians hired was not due at least partially to a reduction in discrimination.  First, the increase 
in hiring may have been larger than the increase in auditionees, and the marginal auditionees 
may have been well qualified than the inframarginal auditionees.  That was what Goldin and 
Rouse found for women.  Second, even if the possible increased number of auditionees were 
completely responsible for the increased number of hires, the number may have increased 
because Asian musicians perceived a reduction in discrimination (even if one did not occur).  
Auditioning is expensive, and musicians who think they will be discriminated against may decide 
not to audition for that reason.  In that sense, we can say that the increase in hires was due to a 








discrimination.  (To see this argument in an extreme and hypothetical case : Suppose that 
originally orchestras had big signs that said, ‘No women or Asians need apply,’ but in fact if any 
had applied the people making the hiring decisions would have treated them fairly.  Then the 
signs are removed, and more women and Asians audition and get hired.  Even though we 
cannot in this case directly attribute the increased hiring to changed dispositions to hire on the 
part of the people making the hiring decisions—hence, discrimination by them—we can 
attribute it to a reduction in the signals about discrimination. Similarly, for women and Asian 
musicians, to the extent that blind auditions encouraged more auditions, it was by reducing the 
signals about discrimination.) 
  
 
1. Literature review 
 We draw on two strands of literature: that on orchestras, and that on labor market 
discrimination against Asians. 
 Goldin and Rouse (2000) examined how the introduction of blind auditions affected the 
hiring of female musicians at top American orchestras, as we have noted.  We follow much of 
their identification strategy and use some of their data; the main difference is that we look at 
Asians rather than women.  They also use two data sets: one on auditions, and one orchestra 
rosters.  The audition data set is confidential and we have nothing like it, and so we cannot 
replicate any of their results from this data set.  We have replicated most of their data on 
orchestra rosters, and extended their results to include Asians. 
 The literature on labor market discrimination against Asians is more varied.  Banerjee et 
al. (2018) is the paper most closely related to this.  In a large Canadian resumé audit dealing 
with skilled positions, they find that large employers were 20 percent less likely to seek 








less likely.  In contrast, we look at real Asians rather than resumés with Asian-sounding names, 
actual performance of job tasks rather than claims about experience, hiring decisions rather 
than call-backs for interviews, and consequential rather than hypothetical transactions.   
 Most of the rest of the papers on Asian labor market experience look at data sets where 
individuals are not linked to specific employers, and so cannot test for disparate treatment.  
Examples are Junanker et al. (2006) for Australia, Arabsheibani and Wang (2010), Hilger (2016), 
Hisnanick (2003), Yoo (2009), Weinberger (1998), and U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1988).   
 
2. Orchestras and auditions 
The orchestral hiring process is complex and consists of multiple rounds of auditions. Goldin 
and Rouse (2000) provide a detailed account of how audition procedures evolved during 1950s 
and 1990s in American symphony orchestras. Overall, there was a gradual democratization in 
the hiring process. Before 1960s the hiring of new players largely depended on the will of the 
music director, namely the chief conductor of the orchestra. Music directors back then were 
disciplinarians at best and authoritarians at worst. One crucial task for the music director/chief 
conductor is to ensure each member of the orchestra executes the instructions given from the 
podium. For many years music directors retained complete control over orchestral personnel. 
Music directors decided which musician to hire or to fire1. Auditions often were mere 
formalities. 
The Boston Symphony Orchestra (BSO) initiated the policy of blind auditions in 1952, although 
the actual reason for the change remains unknown. During 1960s and 1970s, orchestral 
musicians and the musicians’ unions began to challenge the authoritarian control of the music 
director over the orchestra’s hiring and firing of the players. “Blind auditions” were introduced 
                                                      








as a way to curtail the music director’s autocratic power.  Most other top American orchestras 
slowly followed BSO’s example in 1970s and 1980s. 
Today, orchestras have evolved to a more democratic process of hiring. Typically, it is led 
jointly by an audition committee composed of elected orchestra members and the music 
director, partly because of the pressure from musicians’ unions. Applicants go through three 
rounds of live-auditions: the preliminary, the semi-final and the final. However, in many cases 
especially of the top orchestras, there is a pre-screening round before the preliminary, and a 
trial period if the candidate passes the final of the live-auditions. The pre-screening round 
requires prospective applicants to submit résumés and audition tapes/videos before they can 
be invited to play in the live-auditions; the trial asks the final candidate to play with the 
orchestra in regular rehearsals and concerts before being formally offered the position. Douglas 
Yeo (2018), a bass trombonist of Boston Symphony Orchestra from 1985 to 2012, offered a 
comprehensive summary of the existing audition system in the U.S. on his personal website2. 
“In terms of maximizing efficiency and reducing costs, the role of pre-screening is to limit the 
number of applicants to perform in the live-auditions in front of a jury. It is a cost-saving 
strategy to both the orchestra and the applicants. Orchestras endure high costs in order to hold 
live-auditions that span several days; the applicants endure high costs in traveling expenses and 
accommodations. The role of trials is thus to ensure that the player whom the audition 
committee has selected in the final is actually a good fit for the orchestra. Because the full-time 
orchestral jobs in top orchestras are tenured positions, orchestras do not want to hire a virtuoso 
soloist but who is unable to adapt his or her playing for an orchestral environment.” 
The high cost to applicants that Yeo discusses is one reason why musicians who think that 
they might be discriminated against might be reluctant to audition. 
                                                      
2 Douglas Yeo, “Symphony Auditions: Preparation and Execution” Douglas Yeo Trombone online, accessed 








It is important to note that what we (and Goldin and Rouse) call “blind auditions” are not 
totally blind. First, the pre-screening and the trial remain non-screened. During the trial period, 
the final candidate is invited to participate in orchestral rehearsals and concerts as a regular 
member of the orchestra. This process cannot be “blind” and serves an important purpose of 





Table 1: Orchestra Audition Procedure Summary Table 
Name Code Preliminaries Semi-finals Finals
A Blind since 1973 Blind (varies) since 1973 Not blind
SANFRA
N





Blind since at least 






D Blind since 1986
Blind since 1986; varies
until 1993
1st part blind since 
1993; 2nd part not 
blind 
E
Use of screen varies until 
1981
Use of screen varies Not blind
STLOUIS F Blind since at least 1972 Blind since at least 1972
Blind since at least 
1972
PITTS G Blind since 1986 Use of screen varies Not blind
CSO H Blind since 1970 Not blind Not blind
MET I Blind since 1979 Blind since 1979 Blind since fall 1983








CLEVE K Not blind Not blind Not blind
Known Identity: 
SANFRAN: San Francisco Symphony Orchestra 
NYPHIL: New York Philharmonic 
STLOUIS: St Louis Symphony Orchestra 
PITTS: Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra 
CSO: Chicago Symphony Orchestra 
MET: Metropolitan Opera Orchestra or MET Orchestra 
BSO: Boston Symphony Orchestra 
CLEVE: Cleveland Orchestra 
Unknown Identity 3 : 
LAPHIL: Los Angeles Philharmonic 
DSO: Detroit Symphony Orchestra 
PHILLY: Philadelphia Orchestra 
 
In “blind” auditions, a screen is placed between the jury and the auditionee so that the jury 
members cannot identify the auditionee. The true identity of the auditionee is replaced by and 
corresponds to an individual number assigned by the orchestral manager in advance of the 
audition. Orchestras began to adopt the use of screens in live- auditions at different pace since 
the 1970s. Thus, only the orchestral manager knows the true identities of the auditionees. Table 
1, reconstructed after Goldin and Rouse (2000), states the years in which major American 
orchestras adopted screens. In Goldin and Rouse (2000), the identities of individual orchestras 
were masked and replaced by letters due to confidentiality. After contacting orchestral archives 
individually, the identities of 8 out of 11 orchestras were uncovered. For three orchestras we 
                                                      
3 The respective departments of these three orchestras did not respond to the email inquiries with regard to the 








don’t when the “blind” policy was implemented because of non-response and non-disclosure by 
their archive departments. 
It is important for identification that orchestras did not adopt blind auditions for any reason 
that would also induce them to hire more Asian musicians.  Goldin and Rouse (2000, p. 723) 
write: “Of particular concern is that more meritocratic orchestras adopted screens earlier, 
producing the curious result that the screen increased the likelihood that women were hired.”  
They show that the time of adoption the screen is not related to the number of women 
members, or the “Big Five” status of the orchestra, and is slightly negatively related to the 
proportion of new members.  Hence they do not believe that endogeneity provides any threat 









Since a full-size symphony orchestra maintains no more than 110 full-time musicians, the 
success rate for getting an orchestral job in the top orchestras is extremely low. Using the case 
given by the musicians’ union of the Metropolitan Opera Orchestra (MET)4, MET received 208 
submissions of résumés for an audition held in 2014. The passing rate of résumés is roughly 
between 0.3 and 0.4; 42 out of 208 were asked to submit additional audition tapes and only 3 
out of those 42 applicants were invited to play for the live-audition. The rate of advancing from 
preliminary to semi-final is 15/67 = 0.224; the rate of advancing from semi-final to final is 2/15 = 
                                                     
4 William Short, “Auditioning for the MET Orchestra,” The Metropolitan Opera Orchestra Committee online, April 








0.133. Finally, the orchestra had to choose 1 winner for the position out of 2 final candidates. 
The success rate of this audition is 1/208 = 0.0048. 
Becoming a member of a top orchestra takes a long time.  Good instrumentalists begin to 
learn to play the instrument around the age of five. At the age of eighteen, they go to 
conservatories for four years of advanced training before becoming qualified orchestral players. 
It is rare for a young instrumentalist to play in a major orchestra as the first job. Because the 
success rate of orchestral auditions is really low, after graduation, they try out multiple 
auditions wherever there is a vacancy. They gain practical experience by auditioning and 
probably work as substitute players for about 2 years during the same time. They would most 
likely win a position in smaller regional orchestras that pay per service (rehearsals plus 
concerts). If they want to play in major orchestras that provide tenure contracts, they would 
continue to audition for at least two years, depending on job availability and luck. Eventually, 
for ones who persist, they would land positions in top orchestras after eight to ten years after 
graduating college. So the “gestation period” for orchestral members is on the order of 25 to 30 
years.  For large numbers of Asians to be entering major orchestras in the 1980s, for instance, 
learning Western classical instruments would have had to have been popular among Asian 
populations in the 1950s. 
 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
Goldin and Rouse (2000) collected data from two sources: the audition records of individual 
auditionees obtained from orchestra personnel managers and orchestra archives; the personnel 
rosters of orchestras obtained by collecting musicians’ names from concert programs. Of the 








confidential. The absence of the actual audition records prevents us from estimating the 
probability of an individual being advanced from an audition round at an orchestra.  
Therefore, our dependent variables will simply be the number or proportion of Asians hired 
each year. The number of Asians hired is the product of the number of Asians who apply and 
the probability that an Asian will be hired conditional on applying.  Variation in the number of 
Asians hired can be due to variation in either the number applying or conditional probability of 
being hired.  But the number applying is plausibly an increasing function of the conditional 
probability of being hired, and so the product should also be an increasing function of the 
conditional probability of being hired.  The number applying also depends on the number of 
qualified musicians, but that number should not increase discontinuously.   
Two articles “Asian American ethnic identification by surname” (Lauderdale and Kestenbaum 
2000)5 and “Development and Validation of a Surname List to Define Chinese Ethnicity” (Quan 
et al. 2006)6 conveniently compiled for us lists containing characteristic ethical Asian surnames. 
We used the appendix of the two studies on the identification of Asian-American surnames to 
identify the Asian orchestral members in our data. 
Although not all roster data share a similar time interval, given that no major orchestras had 
full-time Asian members before 1940 and all began to have new Asian members after 1950, we 
readjust a general time interval for all orchestras to be between 1931 and 1995.  
Another minor issue with the data is that we were only able to define “blind auditions” in this 
paper as “any blind auditions” occurred in the hiring process. Due to the limitation of the source 
data provided by Goldin and Rouse, we were unable to refine our definition of blind audition to 
                                                      
5 Diane Lauderdale and Bert Kestenbaum, “Asian American ethnic identification by surname,” Population Research 
and Policy Review 19(3), 2000: 283-300. 









be “only blind preliminaries and/or semifinals vs. completely blind auditions” as it was defined 
by the Table 10 in Goldin and Rouse. 
We will test for the effect of blind auditions with two different equations. Because many 
orchestras did not use screens in the final round, we use the year in which the screen was first 
used in the preliminary round as the year in which the blind audition policy was implemented. 
First, we will use the proportion of members of each orchestra who are Asian in each year as 
our dependent variable.  We call this the Asian rate.  We will estimate the following equation by 
OLS: 
 
  =   +   	  +  
 +  +     (1) 
Here,  denotes the Asian rate for orchestra i in year t ; 	 is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 if and only if orchestra i uses blind auditions in year t ; 
 are year fixed effects, and  
are orchestra fixed effects.  We estimate equation (1) for the eight orchestras for which we have 
data.  Our primary interest is in , the effect on the Asian rate of blind auditions.  The rising 
numbers of Asians with training in Western music should be picked up in the year fixed effects.   
Second, we will concentrate on newly hired orchestral members.  The Asian rate as we 
defined it above is a stock not a flow, and blind auditions should affect the flow of Asian 
members into the orchestra, not the flow out.  Hence we will also estimate the following 
Poisson regression: 
  () =   +   	 + ℎ +  +  
 +     (2) 
Here,  denotes the number of Asian orchestral members hired by orchestra i in year t ; ℎ  
denotes the total number orchestral members hired by orchestra i in year t ; and   denotes 
the total size of orchestra i in year t.  Thus we control for both the total number of members 















A. The Overall Trend in the Asian rate 
 
 
Despite the limitation of the existing data, we are able to show the overall trend in the 
proportion of orchestral players who are Asian, using the roster data collected by Goldin and 








orchestras. Most of the names repeat over a number of years indicating the period in which a 
particular player was a member of the orchestra. Figure 1 shows graphically the trend over 65 
years. A sharp drop or rise implies that an Asian player was hired as a substitute by the 
orchestra or was offered a one-year contract for that particular year. Major orchestras did not 
have Asian players until 1950s, and the proportion of Asian players is consistently low between 
1950s and early 1980s. The proportion of Asian players started to increase around 1985. This 
general upward trend coincides with the years in which most of the orchestras began to use 
screens in live-auditions. 
 
 









From Table 1, seven orchestras changed their audition policy from “not blind” to “blind” in 
our study period.   In Figure 2 we show the Asian rate for these orchestras as a function of years 
before and after the date on which they first used the screen... Figure 2 shows a substantial 
increase of the Asian rate and a fairly continuous up-ward trend after t = 0. It suggests strongly 
that blind auditions raised the Asian rate. 
 
C. Regression results 
 Table 2 summarizes the results of equation (1), the OLS regression for the Asian rate.   
 
Table 2: Regression Results for the Asian Rate 
OLS regression 
 Coefficient  




R-squared  0.66107  
   
Number of observations 463  
 
Dependent variable is the Asian rate.  Controls for year and orchestra.  Robust standard error 
in parentheses. 
The coefficient on blind auditions is positive and significant at the 1 percent level.  Orchestras 
with blind auditions have on average one-half more Asian orchestral members in the years in 








five or six Asian members, and usually have fewer, this result has economic as well as statistical 
significance. 
  
Table 3 summarizes the results for the Poisson regression for Asian hires. 
 
Table 3: Regression results for Asian hires 
Poisson regression 
 Coefficient Coefficient 





Total hires  
0.02571  
(0.02651) 
Size of the orchestra  
0.13123  
(0.02884) 
AIC 308.78 294.95 
Number of observations 334 334 
 
     
Dependent variable is number of Asian orchestral members hired.  Controls for year and 









 Once again, blind auditions increase the rate at which Asian orchestral members are hired.  
The effect is large: about four times as many Asian musicians are hired when blind auditions are 
used, as when they are not used. Total hires and the size of the orchestra do not have significant 
effects.   
 
Table 4 summarizes the results for the Probit regression for Asian hires. 
 
Table 4: Regression results for Asian hires 
Probit regression 
 Coefficient Coefficient 





Total hires  
0.01090  
(0.01723) 
Size of the orchestra  
0.08665  
(0.02213) 
AIC 263.07 251.5 











Both OLS and Poisson results have shown that the use of ‘blind auditions’ in orchestra’s hiring 
process increases the number of Asian players in top orchestras. Goldin and Rouse (2000) 
conclude by stating that the introduction of blind auditions helped female musicians in their 
quest to join top orchestras.  We have shown that it helped Asian musicians, too.  Neither 
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